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Physician Discipline in California:
A Code Blue Emergency
by Robert C. Fellmeth*

I. INTRODUCTION
Physician discipline in California is a
code blue emergency. The system cannot
and does not protect Californians from
incompetent medical practice. It is effectively moribund.
Each year, 50,000-80,000 phone calls
come to the Board of Medical Quality
Assurance (BMQA), which regulates
physicians. Uncoordinated complaint
handlers lacking medical or legal experience cull from these calls a current level
of 6,000 annual complaints about physician competence, sobriety, or honesty
within BMQA's discipline jurisdiction.
One-half of these are then eliminated as
without merit, or by informal warning
phone calls or conferences with the
accused physicians. Of the current level
of 2,500-3,000 per year considered serious enough for formal investigation, 109
resulted in formal accusation or hearing
in fiscal year 1987-88. All but those 109
were closed, routed, or "resolved" in
secrecy. Thirty of those 109 were later
dismissed or withdrawn.
The 79 formal accusations pursued
resulted in the revocation of 27 licenses
during 1987-88, down from 40 in 198687. License suspensions were at 15 in
1987-88, down from 18 in 1986-87.
Levels of both revocations and suspensions for 1988-89 appear to be even
lower yet. A grand total of 12 physicians
were subject to any discipline (revocation, suspension, or probation) in 198788 for incompetence, and 5 for selfabuse of drugs or alcohol. These levels
are typical, not aberrational statistics.
* The author is a tenured law professor at the University of San Diego
School of Law and Director of the
Center for Public Interest Law. Since
January 1987, Professor Fellmeth has
served as the State Bar Discipline Monitor pursuant to section 6086.9 of the
Business and Professions Code. Assisting
in the research, drafting, and editing of
this report were CPIL staff counsel
James R. Wheaton, Julianne B. D'Angelo,
and Kate G. Turnbull.
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These performance levels cover 70,000
licensed physicians currently practicing
in California. Many more than the 27
physicians whose licenses were revoked
in I 987-88 are annually convicted of
multiple felonies. Seven hundred fifteen
(715) physicians and health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) were either adjudged liable for malpractice or agreed
to settlements in excess of $30,000 in
1987-88, up 50% from 457 in 1984-85.
Two hundred forty-nine (249) physicians
had their privileges suspended or revoked by hospitals for reasons of drug
impairment or medical incompetence
in 1987-88, a record number. The
American Medical Association (AMA)
estimates that 7,000-10,000 currently
practicing physicians in California are
so severely impaired that they cannot
safely practice medicine. Malpractice
premiums allegedly paid due to claims
and judgments caused by incompetent
practice have increased to the $50,000$80,000 per year range for many physicians and most surgeons. Over the past
five years, while the number of physicians has increased from 60,000 to
70,000, complaints have increased from
just over 4,000 per year to 6,000. But
public discipline has declined to trivial
levels.
This system of "public protection" is
now in its final death from a choking
backlog. At this moment, 721 facially
meritorious cases that are serious enough
for formal investigation sit in files unassigned. Most of these cases are "Priority I" cases; that is, they involve an
immediate threat to patient health. Six
hundred fifty-nine (659) more are assigned and remain in additional investigator
backlogs (now under investigation for
more than six months without resolution). Another 1,000 are in intake backlog. None of these physicians are subject
to interim suspension. Since 1985-86,
only three temporary restraining orders
have been issued to prevent physician
practice during the three to four years
of a typical proceeding, which stretches
to six to ten years where the accused
physician contests the discipline in court.
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The discipline system is operated by
people who are not properly trained to
make the decisions demanded, and is
controlled at every critical step by currently practicing physicians who eliminate almost every case. To be precise,
more than 97% of facially valid complaints never see the light of day. The
attitude of those making these decisions
is openly solicitous of the physician.
While physician rehabilitation is one
statutory goal, it is the preoccupation of
the current system. The profession and
current administration, to some extent
over Board and staff objection, have
resisted raising physician licensing fees
above the current levels of $145 per
year. Current fees assessed for discipline
are less than the amount spent on malpractice premiums for six hours of typical practice. The discipline budget
proposed no additional positions for
1989. Only two-and-one-half positions
have been added in the last five years.
For the past year, the Center for
Public Interest Law (CPIL) has conducted a comprehensive investigation of
BMQA's physician discipline system.
On April 5, 1989, CPIL issued its initial
report, which documents major deficiencies throughout the system and recommends substantial structural and administrative changes. The statistics cited in
the report are taken directly from the
files of BMQA. 1 What follows is a condensed version of that report. CPIL's
major recommendations are highlighted
in bold print.

II. CURRENT OPERATIONAL
MODEL FOR THE DISCIPLINE
OF PHYSICIANS AND ALLIED
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
A. Structure
BMQA operates under the Department of Consumer Affairs within the
executive branch of California state
government. It is a quasi-independent
regulatory agency exercising broad
powers under the Medical Practice Act
(Business and Professions Code section
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2000 et seq.) and other statutes designed
to assure competent and honest delivery
of medical care to consumers in California. BMQA includes nineteen members appointed to four-year terms. By
provision of law, twelve of those members must be currently practicing physicians. Hence, members of the profession
directly control the state agency and
exercise police powers under broad authority on behalf of the general public
and for its protection.
The Board is separated into three
autonomous divisions: the Division of
Allied Health Professions (DAHP), the
Division of Licensing (DOL), and the
Division of Medical Quality (DMQ).
DMQ consists of seven BMQA members
and meets approximately every three
months. The Board members constituting DMQ oversee an enforcement program and exercise authority comparable
to that exercised by other boards or
commissions in California state government. That is, the critical rulemaking
and adjudicative decisions made by
DMQ members operate effectively as
final state determinations.
The Division of Allied Health Professions includes eight separate examining committees which license non-physician health care providers. These eight
committees regulate acupuncturists,
physical therapists, physician's assistants, hearing aid dispensers, podiatrists,
psychologists, speech pathologists/ audiologists, and respiratory care therapists.
In addition, medical assistants, registered
dispensing opticians, research psychoanalysts, and contact lens dispensers are
also directly regulated by DAHP. The
enforcement of the Medical Practice Act
as to these allied health professionals is
assumed by their respective committees
under BMQA. DMQ provides investigative services and findings within its
disciplinary operation to these allied
health committees for action in the administrative adjudicative process.

B. Statutory Duty
The Medical Practice Act provides
general statutory authority under which
DMQ exercises considerable rulemaking
powers and directs the discipline/ enforcement function. Under the statute,
DMQ is directly responsible for the investigation of allied health professionals,
and for the investigation and final adjudicative outcome of the following
kinds of abuse in medical practice: (1)
gross negligence; (2) incompetence; (3)
excessive prescribing or administering
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of drugs or treatment; (4) the conviction
of a crime; (5) a conviction under, or
compromise of, a narcotics or drug statute; (6) misuse of dangerous drugs, narcotics, or alcohol; (7) furnishing drugs
to addicts contrary to law; (8) prescribing dangerous drugs without a prior
medical examination; (9) medical illness;
and (10) intoxication while attending a
patient.
The statutory command to DMQ is
protection of the public from physician
incompetence, dishonesty, or alcohol/
drug abuse (whether by the physician or
improper facilitation of private use). No
other profession or trade regulated by
the state is more justifiably restrained
for assured quality of care than the
medical profession. Consumers entrust
their lives, personal health, and welfare
to physicians to a degree unknown in
other professional relationships. A lack
of competence may result in irreparable
harm to consumers. To preclude that
harm, the state has interposed significant barriers to entry into the profession. The accreditation of medical
schools, a difficult series of examinations, and residency requirements in
which actual performance is reviewed,
all predate final licensure by BMQA.
Despite the initial difficulty in securing licensure, the medical license is a
general license unrelated to the actual
area of medicine likely to be practiced.
Although medical practice is highly
specialized in nature, a general medical
license is granted, allowing-for purposes of state control-practice in any
or a large number of medical fields.
There is no required post-licensure retesting. Continuing education requirements are minimal. There is no required
medical malpractice coverage guaranteeing recovery to patients harmed by incompetent physicians.
A supplemental series of private sector admission and certification standards exists, which may serve some theoretical competence-enhancing purpose.
"Board certification" standards have
been established for specialties. These
do not preclude practice in those areas
by others, but may give some warning
to informed patients about competence.
Most important, hospital privileges must
be obtained and retained by a physician
in order to gain the access to hospital or
related facilities most specialties require.
This last control operates beyond the
scope of the state and is subject to the
limitations discussed below.
The burden on the regulatory agency
to ensure honest and competent physician services, relied upon by consumers,

is rightfully heavy. This responsibility is
enhanced by the irreparable nature of
the failure to ensure that competence,
by the lack of post-licensure quality control, and by the intrusion of private
decisionmakers in the disallowance of
practice by their peers.

C. Present Procedure (Theoretical)
1. Outreach: Consumer Complaints.
Consumers or patients account for over
50% of the complaints received by DMQ
about physicians and allied health professionals. Complaints are received at
one of the seven regional offices of
DMQ. Six of these offices (Torrance,
Woodland Hills, San Bernardino, Santa
Ana, Sacramento, and San Mateo) have
one consumer services representative
(CSR) who serves an initial intake
function. Operating under the general
supervision of the Regional Office Supervisor and a Medical Consultant appointed for each region, the CSR evaluates
the case upon intake. The CSR may
close the complaint immediately as
"mediated, negotiated, settled or dismissed." Complaints closed by the CSR
are presumptively "without merit" and
are automatically purged, without review, from DMQ's records after thirty
days. Complaints relevant to allied
health professionals may be referred to
their respective committee or enforcement personnel as appropriate. Allegations which, if true, constitute violations
of the Medical Practice Act, may be
referred for investigation.
2. Other Reporting. In addition to
receiving consumer complaints, DMQ
receives reports on criminal convictions
of licensees. DMQ may also receive socalled "section 805" (of the Business and
Professions Code) reports regarding the
denial, restriction, or revocation of hospital privileges. These reports are filed
with DMQ by professional liability insurers (section 801), uninsured licensees or
their counsel (section 802), clerks of the
court (section 803), and peer review entities (section 805). Medical malpractice
reports (sections 801-03) notify the Board
when a malpractice case judgment, settlement, or arbitration award against a
physician exceeds $30,000. Regional
Medical Consultants review each report
to determine whether DMQ investigation is warranted. Note that although
malpractice awards may be based on
simple negligence, disciplinary action by
BMQA requires gross negligence or repeated negligent acts.
Section 805 reports require the chief
of the medical staff of any organized
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system where physicians, clinical psychologists, or podiatrists work to notify
BMQA when any licensed physician is
denied staff privileges, has had privileges
limited, or is removed from the staff.
Section 805 also requires that the covered facilities request relevant information from the Board regarding any
licensed physician prior to granting or
renewing staff privileges.
DMQ also receives complaints from
other government agencies including the
federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the state Department of
Health Services, the state Board of Pharmacy, and district attorneys (usually
related to Medi-Cal fraud or drug violations).
3. Consumer Services Representatives (CSRs). Within ten days of the
receipt of a complaint from a consumer,
the CSR is to acknowledge receipt of
that complaint. The flow chart for the
typical complaint is presented in Exhibit
1 (at the end of this article). The case
will be assigned a priority from I to 4.
Up until February 1989, 2 the highest
priority is given to those complaints
which, if proven, demonstrate a high
potential for public harm. Complaints
in this category include gross negligence,
sexual abuse, incompetence, substance
abuse, mental illness, and those which
allege criminal behavior. These highpriority cases are to be assigned to an
investigator within thirty days and the
investigation is to be completed within
180 days.
The next priority classification encompasses complaints which require
additional information before a decision
can be made regarding the disposition
of the case. Until a decision is made,
these cases are handled by the CSR, the
Regional Supervisor, and the Medical
Consultant.
Complaints which, even if proven,
would probably not result in discipline
are within the third priority. In such
cases, merely bringing the complaint to
the attention of the physician may prevent more serious problems in the future.
These cases are not referred for investigation, but are addressed through information and warning letters.
The lowest priority is given to complaints which do not involve patient
care issues and appear to be the least
serious in nature. Most of these complaints can be resolved through appropriate referrals and warning letters.
4. Regional Medical Consultant/
Supervising Investigator. Where the
CSR evaluation indicates appropriate
jurisdiction for DMQ enforcement, the
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case will be reviewed by a Regional
Medical Consultant and/or a Supervising Investigator. The Supervising
Investigator may refer the matter to
another agency or close it as without
merit. A case investigation tracking
system (CITS) will be checked to determine whether any existing investigations
are under way or whether prior discipline may be relevant, before assigning
it for formal investigation.
5. Regional Supervisor/ Opening of
Investigation. If the Regional Supervising Investigator finds that the complaint warrants formal investigation,
he/she may order the opening of a
formal investigative file. A file is opened
and one of approximately 39 investigators is assigned to the case. Investigators are largely concentrated in Los Angeles and San Mateo; the other offices
have from one to five investigators. The
investigator communicates with the accused physician, obtains medical records,
commences an investigation, and files
regularly required progress reports at
one- or two-month intervals.
6. Review by Regional Medical Consultant. DMQ includes a Chief Medical
Consultant and Regional Medical Consultants operating from several of the
DMQ regions noted above. These medical consultants are generally current or
recent practicing physicians and operate
out of six of the eight regions. A Regional Medical Consultant is relied upon by
DMQ for critical decisions and may,
with the agreement of the Supervising
Investigator, close a case, refer it to an
expert panel for recommendation, or
may engage in what is termed a "physician performance conference." This latter
represents an opportunity for the consultant to informally review the problem
with the physician and to receive assurances of behavior modification in the
future. The case may also be referred to
a Medical Quality Review Committee
(MQRC) for non-disciplinary review.
Finally, the consultant may recommend
formal discipline.
7. Medical Quality Review Committees (MQRCs). Pursuant to sections
2320 and 2332 of the Business and Professions Code, DMQ has created fourteen
Medical Quality Review Committees in
various regions throughout the state.
These MQRCs consist largely of practicing physicians appointed on a voluntary basis to assist DMQ in its
enforcement and adjudicative functions.
The MQRCs serve as a liaison with
medical and community groups, perform
non-disciplinary reviews, and may function as hearing panels for formal dis-
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ciplinary cases. They range in size from
ten to forty members and consist of
physicians, allied health professionals,
and public members. A majority of the
Committee members are practicing physicians, nominated by DMQ, medical societies, and medical school deans. Public
members and allied health members are
directly appointed by the Governor.
Each term of office is four years.
8. Referral to Office of Attorney
General for Accusation. The Office of
the Attorney General receives the investigative reports of the BMQA investigators
and decides whether to prepare formal
disciplinary charges ("accusations'') for
signature by BMQA's Executive Director
and filing. For allegations involving
single acts of incompetence or gross
negligence, or any case involving quality
of care, such an accusation requires the
Attorney General to obtain the concurrence of two outside medical experts
that the investigation indicates incompetence. Incompetence may not be simple
negligence, but must be a pattern of
negligent acts or gross incompetence and
must be proved by "clear and convincing" evidence. Hence, the standard for
prosecution under the Medical Practice
Act is substantially more than is required to justify tort damages for negligence in a civil case against a physician
or other health professional.
9. Administrative Hearing. The Attorney General and BMQA determine
whether to file an accusation, which
seeks the formal discipline of a physician
or other health professional pursuant to
the adjudicative sections of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Government Code sections 11500 to 11528).
The Attorney General must show with
clear and convincing evidence to a reasonab le certainty that the physician or allied
health professional has violated a statutory duty warranting license revocation,
suspension, or other discipline. Pursuant
to the AP A, the physician may answer
the accusation by formal pleading and
commence discovery.
Following discovery and preliminary
motions, a hearing occurs. A number of
alternative formats are available under
the APA and DMQ practice for that
hearing. The first alternative is to assign
the matter to an administrative law judge
(ALJ) from the Office of Administrative
Hearings for hearing and tentative decision. The second is to use the ALJ for
evidentiary rulings at the hearing and to
appoint five members of the local
MQRC to sit as a panel and make the
formal tentative decision. The third
alternative is to use the ALJ for eviden-
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tiary rulings at the hearing but to have
DMQ sit as an adjudicative panel and
make the decision directly. Where one
of the first two alternatives is chosen
(which is the normal course), the accused
physician and the Attorney General both
have available to them right of review
by DMQ.
Under Business and Professions Code
section 2335(c), DMQ review is required
where the proposed decision of the ALJ
or MQRC would restrict or limit the
extent, scope, or type of practice for a
period exceeding one year; suspend the
license for more than thirty days; or
revoke the license.
10. DMQ Review Hearing. DMQ
receives the hearing transcript and recommended decision. Where DMQ declines
to adopt the decision upon review of the
proceedings below, it may hold its own
hearing. Written and oral argument at
that hearing is permissive at the option
of the respondent and the Attorney
General.
In the case of allied health professionals, the adjudicative process does
not occur through DMQ but, after the
filing of an accusation, is then subject to
ALJ proceedings either alone or in conjunction with panels of the respective
allied health examining committees, subject to review by the appropriate allied
health committee within DAHP. Like
the physicians who control the majority
of votes in DMQ, the respective allied
health professionals subject to discipline
control those committees engaging in
the review. Where DMQ (or the allied
health committee) makes a decision recommending no discipline, that decision is
effectively final. Although a substantial
procedural error by DMQ may theoretically give rise to a basis for court review
initiated by the Office of the Attorney
General, such a review is rarely sought
and would be subject to overwhelming
difficulties in reversing a substantive
decision of no discipline.
11. Superior Court Review by Writ
of Mandate. Where the final decision of
DMQ is to impose discipline-even
where that discipline is a suspension
conditioned on retesting or other probationary requirements, the accused
physician has an absolute right to review by writ of mandate in superior
court. The accused physician or allied
health professional has a substantial
number of permissible venues in which
to petition for judicial review of the
administrative procedure which led to a
final decision of discipline. Filing a
petition for writ of mandate delays the
imposition of any actual penalty, includ-
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ing probationary conditions imposed on
a suspended revocation or suspension,
until the conclusion of court review.
The superior court is required by law to
exercise its "independent judgment",
rather than applying the "substantial
evidence" test. Under the latter test, the
court determines whether the findings
are supported by substantial evidence in
light of the entire record. In recognition
of the potential taking from the physician
of a "vested right" (the right of continued use of the license to practice), the
superior court reviews the evidence de
novo. That is, the court does not review
the decision of the ALJ or Division for
error, but reviews the entire factual
record and exercises his/her own independent judgment as to the appropriateness of the finding that the Medical
Practice Act was violated (thus warranting discipline), and that the discipline
imposed was appropriate to that offense.
12. Court of Appeal Review. Where
the accused physician or health professional is denied the requested writ of
mandate, he/she has a right of appeal to
the court of appeal in which that superior
court sits. Appellate review involves the
transmittal and certification of the ad- ·
ministrative record from the superior
court to the court of appeal, the filing of
written briefs, the scheduling of oral
argument, and submission for final decision. Court of appeal review normally
takes several years to complete.
13. Petition to the Supreme Court.
Whatever the decision of the superior
court or the court of appeal, both the
Attorney General (on behalf of DMQ)
and the accused physician or allied
health professional have a right to petition the Supreme Court for review.
This review by the Supreme Court is
discretionary and may or may not be
granted. Where it is granted, a two- to
three-year period can be expected between the granting of the petition and
the final published decision of the
Supreme Court. In some cases, an accused physician may also seek further
review to the U.S. Supreme Court where
he/ she alleges a federal constitutional
question exists under the statute or
terms of discipline imposed.

III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE SYSTEM'S FLAWS
The basic administrative structure
described above, taken from DMQ documents illustrative and representative of
the current model for discipline, outlines
serious structural infirmities. We describe

infra the problems we have encountered
in the respective stages of the operation
of that system. However, while the basic
structure is still in mind, several general
observations are appropriate.
First, any one of nine separate individuals in the complaint flow process is
able to recommend the closure or diversion of a case from the discipline track.
Thus it is not surprising that in fiscal
year 1987-88, of 4,685 complaints received against physicians, only 109
reached accusation filing for formal
discipline (see Table I). Thirty of these
109 were dismissed or withdrawn. Until
the accusation is filed, the entire procedure described in steps 1-8 above is
not subject to public disclosure. During
fiscal year 1987-88, final discipline output included revocation of 27 physician
licenses, the voluntary surrender of 11,
suspension of 15, and probation without
any actual suspension or revocation for
37 (see Table I). Out of 70,000 practicing
licensees in California, only 42 were
sanctioned by revocation or suspension
of their license. 3
The final discipline result of 42 cases
trivializes any concept of deterrence.
Only 12 physicians received any discipline (including straight probation) for
incompetence in 1987-88, and 5 for selfabuse of drugs or alcohol (see Table 2).
This output is lower than the 58 revocations and suspensions during the 198687 fiscal year, notwithstanding the increase in complaints received from 4,361
in 1986-87 to 4,685 in 1987-88. More
recent data shows a further increase in
complaints to a projected 6,000 per
annum level and a further retraction in
the number of revocations and suspensions. This discipline output represents
but a small fraction of the physicians
who are convicted of serious felonies
every year. During 1987-88, 715 physicians and HMOs suffered malpractice
judgments or settlements of over $30,000;
249 had their hospital privileges denied
or suspended by private action basecl on
medical incompetence or impairment;
and 7,000-10,000 are estimated by the
AMA to be currently impaired by alcohol, drugs, or other infirmity. 4 All of
these numbers have increased markedly
over the last five years, particularly over
the past three years.
The length of time that transpires
during the administrative and judicial
process ranges from six to eight years. 5
During this interim, in virtually every
case, the physician maintains his/ her
license in good standing and is free to
practice medicine within the state of
California. The number of temporary
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TABLE 1
FOUR YEAR ACTION SUMMARY - ALL LICENSEES
ACTIVITY

84/85
MD*

85/86

87/88

86/87

AH

ALL

4652

865

5517

4662

1205

5867

4361

1153

5514

4685

1275

5960

2254
2297
173

234
361
0

2488
2658
173

2117
2229
185

420
468
0

2537
2697
185

2172
2485
202
41

525
407
0

2697
2892
202
41

1913
2170
181
20

532
491
79

2445
2661
217
20

15
14
N/A

17
17
N/A

3
3
2
N/A

26
3
10
8

19
3
9
8

10
0
9
11

12
0
9

N/A

23
3
9
8

2
0
0

N/A

23
0
8
8

4
0
0

N/A

2
3
N/A
N/A

N/A

II

121
14

16
0

137
14

110
10

26
3

136
13

96
8

32
I

128
9

109
9

165
9

164

21

188

159

37

196

143

37

180

148

56
0
58

Physicians called in for medical review
Physicians referred to Diversion Program

223
37

223
37

236
33

212
29

0
N/A

212
29

257
28

260

260

269

0
N/A
0

236
33

Subtotal reviews and referrals
Decisions rendered:
Revocation
Voluntary surrender
Suspension
Probation
Other

0
N/A
0

269

241

0

241

285

17
25
15
45
I

3
0
5
16
I

20
25
20
61
2

22
22
13
49
3

6
0
8
10
0

28
22
21
59
3

40
17
18
42
3

II
3
0
13
3

51
20
18
55
6

27

Complaints Received
Investigations

Cases Opened'
Cases Closed'
Cases to Attorney General
MD Cases to district attorneys

AH* ALL*

MD

AH

ALL

MD

AH

ALL

MD

Administrative Filings

Statement of Issues to deny application
Temporary restraining order
Petition to compel psychiatric exam
Petition to compel competency exam
Accusation/ petition to revoke probation
Non-probation violation
Probation violation
Total Administrative Filings

206

Administrative Actions

Subtotal decisions adopted
Total Administrative Actions

23
N/A
23

280
28
308

103

25

128

109

24

133

120

30

150

92

II
3
10
12
I
37

363

25

388

378

24

402

361

30

391

377

60

437

2
12
19
7
4
10
9

0
0
2
0
0
I
I

2
12
21
7
4

0
0
4
0
0
0
I

I
I
8
I
12

2
2
9
0
14
2
4

0
0
I
I
I
0
I

2
2
10
I
15
2
5

0
0

10

I
I
4
I
II
II
II

3
18
12
3

0
0
2
I
I
0
0

0
0
13
4
19
12
3

63

4

67

40

5

45

33

4

37

47

4

51

II

15
37
2

38
14
25
49
3
129

Other Administrative Outcomes

Statement of Issues to deny license
Withdrawn
Dismissed
Upheld/application denied
Denied/ application granted
Accusation withdrawn
Accusation dismissed
Judicial review completed
Total Other Administrative Outcomes

II

'Approximately half of all complaints cannot proceed to investigation due to lack of information or jurisdiction
•MD - Physician and Surgeon; AH - Allied Health Professions; ALL - Total of MD+ AH

II
II

21ncludes

II

cases from prior years

TABLE 2
FOUR YEAR SUMMARY

DECISIONS RENDERED BY VIOLATION TYPE- ALL LICENSEES
84/85
TYPE OF VIOLATION

85/86

86/87

87/88

MD

AH

ALL

MD

AH

ALL

MD

AH

ALL

MD

AH

ALL

23
13
6
I
17

8
0
3
0
2

31
13
9
I
19

29
14
6
2
9

4
0
0
0

33
14
6
2
16

18
6
2
3

5
0
0
I

23
6
2
4

12
5
6
5

6
0
0
0

18
5
6
5

5
4
0

5
I

10
5
I

7
5
I

2
0
I

9
5
2

0
2
8
17
13

6
2
6
10
0
4

6
4
14
21
17
17

92

37

129

Gross Negligence/ Incompetence
Inappropriate Prescribing or Treatment
Violation of Drug Laws
Self Abuse of Drugs or Alcohol
Gross Immorality/Moral Turpitude

7

Dishonesty/ Fraud

Mental Illness
Aiding Unlicensed Practice
Unprofessional Conduct

9
2
12

0
4
6

9
6
18

2
2
9

I
4
7

3
6
16

General Unprofessional Conduct

Probation Violation

7

7

0

10

0

TOTAL DECISIONS RENDERED

12

2

14

26

102

25

127

109

24

•
I

•
5

27

9
6
7
26
15
19

5
0
0

14
7
13
31
15
19

133

120

30

150

10

Sexual Misconduct
Conviction of a Crime
Discipline by another State Board

Other

•

I
6

•
II

•
•

•

*These categories were replaced in 1986 by the categories which appear in bold face type below.
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restraining orders or interim suspensions
during 1987-88 was zero; there have been
a total of three since 1985-86 (see Table 1).
DMQ spent in excess of $8 million
dollars in enforcement and related overhead allocations to achieve this statistical discipline result. As described
below, the issues of trivial output, expense, and delay are not surprising, given
the multi-layered structure of the discipline system with decisions being made
by the wrong people with inadequate
information and in a fragmented fashion.
The entire system is then further infected
with a blatant solicitude for the profession both in its excessive orientation
toward "rehabilitation", and by the
active participation of interested competitors, peers, and colleagues in the administrative process. The entire structure
does not function as a device to excise
the incompetent physician, but rather as
a means to "help" physicians with problems which might impact patients seriously. Hence, when DMQ President Dr.
Eugene Ellis reminded us in a March 3,
1989 public hearing that "society has a
great investment in the education and
training of physicians and the emphasis
of the DMQ program must be therefore
on rehabilitation," his attitude is not
aberrational, but permeates the structure
of the system from CSRs to the medical
consultants to MQRCs and investigators.
Because no prosecutor charged with protection of the public in the enforcement
of these statutes enters the system until
after a multiplicity of peer entities has
determined that the investigative report
should be presented for formal prosecution, the system operates only in extremis
to discipline physicians.
The in extremis nature of the "scoping" of complaints to its trivial result in
terms of output is apparent when one
considers that the AMA itself recognizes
that drug abuse, alcoholism, and other
infirmities both mental and physical
render l0-15% of practicing physicians
unfit to practice medicine. Hence, California has between 7,000-IO,000 licensed
physicians who are unfit to practice
under AMA standards. Approximately
200 are now participating in BMQA's
drug diversion program, which grants
total immunity from discipline while the
physician is in compliance with the
terms of the program. The incidence of
malpractice and physician negligence is
serious and is reflected in malpractice
judgments upheld on appeal, which have
contributed to insurance premiums now
in the $20,000-$80,000 per year range,
depending on area and specialty.
An output of 42 license revocations

6

or suspensions out of 70,000 practicing
physicians, with 7,000- l0,000 suffering
from alcohol, drug, or other impairment,
and 200 in the diversion program (approximately one-third of whom will not
successfully complete that program), and
malpractice premiums and judgments at
current levels suggest a system in serious
crisis. It is particularly telling that although the number of licensees has
grown, drug abuse has increased over
the decade, and malpractice premiums
and negligence judgments have proliferated, the output of the system has actually declined. The current rate of license
revocations is at 27 per annum.

IV. THE ACTUAL DISCIPLINE
OF CALIFORNIA'S PHYSICIANS
A. Outreach/Detection
The first step in a discipline system
is the detection of behavior which violates statutory standards. As noted
above, approximately 55% of DMQ's
open investigations originate from consumer complaints. Although this source
of information is inadequate for total
reliance, it is a major source of information about likely incompetence, drug
abuse, and dishonesty. It is therefore
appropriate for consumers to be within
easy reach of DMQ to convey relevant
information about the performance of
BMQA licensees.
During 1988, the Assembly Office of
Research performed an investigation and
issued a report about the outreach (and
related) performance of DMQ at the
request of Assemblymember Jackie
Speier. The report was released in July
1988 under the blunt title "No Such
Listing-Consumer Access to the Board
of Medical Quality Assurance. "6 The
report noted that as of June 1988,
BMQA's number appeared in only 33 of
172 surveyed California telephone directories. The cost of being listed in the state
agency section of the Pacific Bell directory is $1.00. BMQA does not advertise
in any telephone book's yellow pages.
The survey also concluded: "(telephone
41 I] information operators are often
unable to help confused callers." Operators are trained only to check phone
numbers covered by that area's phone
directory; hence, if BMQA is not listed,
a call to 411 directory assistance will not
produce a means for consumer access to
this agency. The response is simply "no
such listing exists." Even when consumers are able to obtain a BMQA regional
office number, the number of CSRs to
answer complaint calls is generally in-

sufficient. The report listed three measures BMQA had taken to facilitate
outreach, but described outreach by this
critical agency as generally minimal. As
discussed below, in examining DMQ's
current backlog of investigations, such a
lack of priority concerning outreach is
perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, it
is not indicative of a minimally acceptable operating system.
As described above, DMQ intake is
decentralized in its regional offices in
Sacramento, San Mateo, Fresno, Woodland Hills, Torrance, Santa Ana, and
San Bernardino (as well as storefront
district offices in San Diego and Redding). Hence, CSRs located in one office
may have sufficient time to handle calls
while CSRs in others may not. It is
unclear why there is not a centralized
complaint receipt number and facility.
CSRs do not conduct on-the-scene detailed investigations, nor are they qualified to do so. They need not be in the
field. Further, even for consumers in the
counties where telephone numbers are
available through directories, these are
often toll calls. DMQ should replicate
the complaint receipt reforms of the
State Bar and immediately create a statewide 800 toll-free number listed in every
telephone directory in the state (under
the white pages "State Government" section), with 800 and 411 directory assistance, and included in major yellow page
phone directories under "Physicians Complaints." As described below, CSRs
should be trained and supervised by
experts in the prosecution of medical
incompetence and dishonesty; that is, by
a professional prosecutor familiar with
legal standards and with the methodology required to put together a case
for administrative and judicial review.
The CSRs are currently subject to no
supervision by any person specifically
trained in law in what is essentially a
legal process.
Medical experts in a wide variety
of subject areas should be available to
CSR supervisors in order to gauge the
facial merit of incoming calls by quick
reference. This reference expert panel
should not consist of a single medical
consultant, because any such consultant
may well be trained in a particular area
of medicine but may have very little
knowledge about minimally acceptable
standards of professional care in the
many different specialties in which DMQ
licensees practice.
As one alternative to total reliance
on consumer complaints, DMQ must
monitor the various section 800 reports
described above. At present, it monitors
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criminal convictions; malpractice actions
which are settled or adjudicated in
amounts above $30,000; reports of excessive prescribing (725 reports); reports
from other physicians; and, to a limited
extent, self-reporting through its diversion program. Finally, as noted above,
BMQA receives certain informationusually in the area of drug abuse-from
other agencies such as federal DEA and
the state Board of Pharmacy. Each of
these areas of information-gathering has
serious impediments to its utility.
The tracking of criminal cases postconviction and referral for possible discipline is not timely. Final conviction following appeal often occurs three to four
years after the criminal acts occurred.
Under the current scheme, physicians
are able to continue practicing during
this long interim and often face disciplinary charges not only after they have
been convicted, but after they have
served their sentences. DMQ is then in
the difficult position of attempting to
punish someone for a transgression that
occurred many years ago and for which
that person may have "paid his/ her debt
to society" through incarceration or
stringent terms of probation imposed by
a court.
In fact, many criminal cases warrant
immediate action by DMQ to suspend
the license of those who are accused
prior to conviction. The standard for
conviction of a criminal offense is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt; the standard
for the revocation of a license is clear
and convincing evidence to a reasonable
certainty. The two standards are substantially different. Further, the societal
interest in deterrence and retribution in
punishing a criminal may be Jess urgent
than the need to remove that person
from a position of trust as a physician
in the community. Information about
the potential criminal conduct of physician licensees should be available at
point of arrest by automatic tie-in of
DMQ to the Arrest Notification System
(ANS) of the Attorney General's Office.
Where licensees are fingerprinted, this
system allows the automatic notification
of a regulatory agency whenever its
licensees are arrested at the time of the
arrest. The State Bar has agreed to submit fingerprints of new licensees to the
ANS so this automatic notification may
take place at the most appropriate point
in time-at the initial discovery of the
possible criminal act. DMQ should do
likewise with new medical licensees.
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B. Section 801-03 Reports
(Malpractice Actions)
Section 801, 802, and 803 reports
concerning malpractice actions are made
to DMQ only if there is a settlement or
judgment in excess of $30,000. There
are two problems with this reporting
mechanism. First, a $30,000 stipulation
or judgment figure may or may not
relate to the appropriateness of reporting the matter to DMQ for its separate
purposes. Damages in a malpractice action may be limited for a variety of
reasons. A physician defendant will be
aware of the BMQA notice threshold of
$30,000 and may take $25,000 from the
insurance company and make a side
arrangement for additional funds personally. Alternatively, medical malpractice cases often involve multiple defendants; the physician can avoid reporting
by keeping his/her own settlement below
$30,000, while the plaintiff recovers from
other defendants.
Even in a litigated case, the degree
of negligence of the physician and its
likelihood of recurrence are not factors
which directly relate to passing the
$30,000 threshold amount for reporting.
A physician may commit a series of
egregious wrongs, but the patient involved may not suffer severe damages
beyond additional medical treatment
costs. However, the competence level
revealed may bode ill for future patients,
which should be the focus of DMQ
concern.
On the other hand, the fact of a
malpractice filing is important information for DMQ. The law provides substantial protections to doctors from
malpractice cases. Under the MICRA
statute,7 medical malpractice actions are
severely limited. Damages are substantially restricted, and attorney contingency fees are limited, thus lessening the
likelihood of spurious claims. Hence,
where cases are filed, they are worth
looking at.
BMQA learns about these cases only
at their conclusion, replicating the problem with criminal convictions discussed
above. These allegations, given the
MICRA statute, are appropriate for
immediate DMQ evaluation and tracking. As with the preliminary hearing in
a criminal context, civil filings are usually made under oath and often include
early discovery "on the record." Onthe-record documents include pleadings
and transcripts of depositions of witnesses under oath. At the very least, a
review of this evidence as available will
enable BMQA to evaluate the case for
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its own purposes.
DMQ should evaluate all malpractice
actions from the filing of a claim or suit
and track them in all official documents
filed as to any licensee under its jurisdiction thence forward. Where evidence
adduced indicates the likelihood of an
incompetent practitioner, DMQ should
proactively intervene contemporaneously
with the civil action (not after its conclusion) to protect the public through
interim relief or independent license
revocation action.

C. Coroner Reports
Coroners are another major source
of information about serious physician
incompetence. Coroners evaluate causes
of death as a professional specialty. They
are in a position to perform autopsies,
detect medical failure, and assess physician performance. At present, coroners
are theoretically able to report possible
negligence by physicians-but rarely do
so. Coroners are part of the medical
profession and work with practicing
physicians. This regular working relationship creates an occupational interface
which makes the reporting of physician
incompetence extremely difficult. Coroners who report errors or incompetence
may face pressure or accusations of bias.
They are also subject to charges of "turning in a colleague" with the possible
consequence of depriving that colleague
of his/ her livelihood.
The California Coroners' Association
has candidly admitted that its members
do not routinely report physician error
or incompetence because of the current
voluntary nature of the system. The
Association has requested a mandatory
requirement to report in order to, in
effect, "take its members off the hook."
By removing the discretion, the outside
pressures not to report are eliminated.
Further, the Coroners' Association believes that reports indicating negligence
should be filed without requiring the
coroner to make any findings regarding
"gross negligence" appropriate for discipline. Just as the coroners do not want
discretion on whether to report, they also
do not want discretion on what to report.
These changes in the reporting requirement were endorsed in principle by
the MQRCs and DMQ in December
1988. Draft legislation has been formulated to require coroners or deputy coroners who receive information indicating
that a death may be the result of physician negligence or incompetence to file
a confidential report with BMQA. The
draft also immunizes coroners from
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damages in civil actions as a result of
the filing of such a report. This legislation is important in stimulating one of
the most important sources of information available to DMQ about physician
incompetence and deserves enactment.

D. Section 805 Reports
Until 1988, whenever a licensed physician was "denied staff privileges, removed from medical staff of the institution, or if his or her staff or membership
privileges [were] restricted for a cumulative total of 45 days in any calendar
year for any medical disciplinary cause
or reason," a "section 805" report must
be filed with BMQA. A report includes
a statement detailing the nature of the
so-called "peer review" action and the
reasons for it. The law also required
that a report be made if the removal or
restriction was "by resignation or other
voluntary action that was requested or
bargained for in lieu of medical disciplinary action."
This mechanism for reporting physician incompetence, drug abuse, or dishonesty is theoretically among the most
important sources of information about
physician performance extant. Those
with whom a physician works know
more about his/her economic arrangements, sobriety, and medical competence
than do patients. They are in a position
to survey his/her work in relation to
that of others in the community.
Unfortunately, most of the protection from physician incompetence derives not from the state agency assigned
this basic purpose, but from the private
decisionmaking of medical clinics, hospitals, and other institutions through
peer review proceedings. Physicians must
have access to these facilities in order to
practice, and to the extent that these
facilities deny that access, they affect
who the practitioners are. 8 For the same
reasons that coroners are hesitant to
report occasions of negligence, so are
colleagues of impaired or incompetent
physicians. A detection mechanism that
depends upon such "turning in" may
receive as many reports based on personal animosity and "hospital politics" as
on medical performance.
When reviewing the basis for denial
or suspension of staff privileges, DMQ
seeks to compel information about a
physician's performance which would
otherwise be unavailable. In so doing,
DMQ must recognize the inappropriateness of total reliance on these private
decisionmaking structures. Many do not
afford the physicians involved traditional

8

due process and most have historically
raised serious antitrust questions. The
extent to which a group of competitors
controlling a medical facility is able to
effectively boycott a competitor by excluding him/her from an institution may
indicate incentives other than the objective evaluation of medical performance.
In an industry as lucrative as medical
practice, such ancillary incentives are
not insignificant.
The section 805 law described above
was altered effective January I, 1988,
making a number of changes. These
changes were to some extent spawned
by the Federal Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, an attempt
to improve the amount of data concerning peer review actions and to encourage
those activities by extending immunity
to those making reports through state
and federal law. Two years ago, legislation (SB 1620 and AB 2249) was enacted
by the California legislature, effective
January I, 1988. These bills require more
peer review entities to report; expand
somewhat the definition of "staff privileges"; and require reporting of staff
privileges suspension for 30 days rather
than 45 days, the furnishing of a copy of
the section 805 report to the person who
is its subject (with notice of his/her
right to submit exculpatory information
to the agency), and supplemental reports
where the licensee is deemed to have
satisfied any terms or conditions imposed
as a precondition to renewed staff privileges. As with the previous law, section
805 reports about a physician are submitted to other hospitals to whom that
physician may apply for privileges.
There are numerous problems with
this statute, even as amended. First of
all, the statute defines the term "denial
or termination of privileges" to mean
"failure or refusal to renew a contract or
renew, extend, or re-establish any staff
privileges, when the action is based on
medical disciplinary cause or reason." A
primary problem in receiving adequate
information, even where an institution
decides to deny, suspend, or revoke hospital privileges for a licensee, is the
tendency to let the licensee know there
is a problem and to allow him/ her to
voluntarily resign prior to proceeding.
The other institutions where that physician may have privileges never learn of
the problem and BMQA never investigates his/her performance. This "withdraw your application or resign now"
(or "take a vacation") option is understandably tempting for any medical institution. The alternative is going to be,
under the law as it is evolving, a full-

blown due process hearing. Further,
there is the danger of countersuit.
On the other hand, the institution
may be concerned, in good faith, about
its reputation and its other practitioners
should this marginal or incompetent
practitioner be allowed to continue. The
easy way out is the withdrawal or resignation option, which does not trigger a
section 805 report. In order to meet this
problem, the amendments of section 805
purport to require the reporting of resignations as well. Section 805(d) states:
"in addition to the duty to report set
forth [above] the peer review body also
has the duty to report under this section
a licentiate's resignation from membership, staff, or employment following
notice of an impending investigation
based on information indicating medical
disciplinary cause or reason."
This resignation reporting has a number of problems. First, it does not apply
in cases where an initial application for
privileges is made but has not yet been
reviewed, and is then withdrawn (perhaps upon informal indication that it
would not be accepted). More important, what does "notice of an impending
investigation" mean? In fact, those with
existing hospital privileges, to whom the
resignation reporting requirement may
apply, are well aware in the normal
course of the prospect of an "impending
investigation." It is unclear when the
"impending investigation" is initiated,
and when a withdrawal occurs before it
is initiated, thereby excusing a section
805 report. Second, it is also unclear
what is a "medical disciplinary cause or
reason" in practice. If the reason is
otherwise, no report is required.
The most important legislative change
which might address at least the subsidiary problem is the granting of clear
immunity to those who do report the
incompetence of other physicians. Section 805(d) provides that "no person
shall incur any civil liabilities as a result
of making the report required by this
section." However, the information provided leading to the report, and information directly from physicians to DMQ
about other physicians, is subject to a
limited immunity provision allowing suit
where the matter is not "reasonably believed to be true. "9 While it may appear
appropriate to allow a cause of action
against someone who "unreasonably believes" reports of drug abuse, dishonesty,
or incompetence, such a limited immunity operates as virtually no immunity at
all. In fact, the reported physician need
simply allege a lack of reasonable basis
to file suit. The potential exposure of
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having to defend such a case seriously
impedes reports of drug abuse and incompetence.
Reports made directly to DMQ should
be absolutely privileged without limitation or condition. These reports are kept
confidential by the agency and are the
basis for "leads" for its own independent
investigation. Where a licensee continuously provides false leads, the agency
may begin to disregard that information.
However, the information is not provided to the general public to slander
the reputation of the physician involved,
but is provided to a state agency with
the responsibility to evaluate the sobriety, competence, and honesty of physicians. That report should be made with
full confidence that there will be no
retribution, including the filing of a lawsuit.
Table 3 presents the historical and
recent data of information disclosures
through section 800 reports to DMQ. In
relation to the number of physicians
known to be drug-impaired, the number
of reports is minimal. The reports coming from physicians about the incompetence of their colleagues is an extremely
minor source of information given the
current constraints on such reporting as
noted above.
Failure to submit a section 805 report
gives rise to a misdemeanor criminal
offense. However, as noted above, staff
privilege withdrawal before the impending investigation "begins" and the
ambiguity about the cause being a
"medically disciplinable basis" stimulates
evasion. There has yet to be a misdemeanor criminal prosecution for failure to
file a section 805 report in the history of
the statute. It is critical for DMQ to
gather egregious examples of failure to
so report, and to prosecute those cases
as criminal misdemeanors in order to
send a signal to the medical institutions
about their clear obligations under the
law. In addition, a more useful and
mechanical approach would be to amend
the statute itself to require the reporting
of all withdrawals, denials, suspensions,
or restrictions of medical privileges from
any institution for any reason as a
routine matter. Submitted with that
report should be any documentary or
explanatory information available to the
institution concerning the standard of
care, performance, honesty, or sobriety
under current standards which may apply
to that licensee. Hence, complaints received by the hospital from the staff,
other physicians, and patients must be
transmitted to DMQ where there is any
action regarding privileges, however that
action is characterized by the institution.
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TABLE 3
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND HEALTH FACILITY
REPORTS RECEIVED BY LICENSE TYPE,
SOURCE, AND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE
FOUR YEAR SUMMARY
Medical Malpractice
8 & P Code Section 801: Insurers
Physician and Surgeon
Health Maintenance Organization
Podiatrist

Subtotal
Section 802: Attorneys or Self-Report
Physician and Surgeon
Health Maintenance Organization

Subtotal
Section 803: Courts
Physician and Surgeon
Health Maintenance Organization

Subtotal
Total Malpractice

Health Facility Disciplinary Actions
Section 805: Incomplete Medical Records
Physician and Surgeon
Podiatrist
Psychologist

Subtotal
Section 805.5: Medical Cause or Reason
Physician and Surgeon
Podiatrist
Psychologist

Subtotal
Total Health Facilities

It is not appropriate to delegate to a
private entity, or to an economic competitor in the medical marketplace, the
decision regarding what constitutes a
disciplinable offense. Information should
be supplied to DMQ which would make
that evaluation, and that information
should be completely and automatically
submitted as a matter of normal course. 10

E. Self-Reporting/Diversion
In addition to the sources of information described above, physicians are
in a position to "self-report" under
DMQ's Diversion Program. This program allows physicians who are chemically dependent or suffering from psychological ailments to enter a rehabilitation
program and, in turn, receive immunity
from discipline. This program, as presently constituted, is one of the most
generous and solicitous programs of its

Vol. 9, No. 2

(Spring 1989)

84/85

85/86

86/87

87/88

322
7
340

417
20
12
449

469
0
13
482

455
8
9
472

13
87
100

15
144
159

41
117
158

93
133
226

14

3
17

20
0
20

12
0
12

17
0
17

457

628

652

715

451
4
0
455

712
3

1,034

1,108

13

I

2
1,049

I
I
l,I IO

169
3

249
2

0

I

174

145
3
0
148

172

252

629

865

1,221

1,362

II

171
2
I

716

kind in the nation. Rather than proceed
with discipline and allow an agreement
to seek medical treatment to mitigate
the discipline to be imposed, BMQA
opts for a maximum carrot and minimal
stick by granting absolute immunity so
long as the program is entered and completed. Further, if the referral into the
Diversion Program does not originate
with the discipline system (from DMQ),
failure to complete the program will not
result in discipline or discipline review.
Hence, a self-surrender where discipline
is likely to be imminent will achieve
immunity for a licensee which, as a practical matter, precludes discipline even if
the treatment program is rejected and
abandoned contrary to the written agreement entered into by the licensee with
the program.
We are reserving an analysis of the
Diversion Program for a future report.
However, there are approximately 200
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persons in the Diversion Program. Approximately one-third of those entering
the program have failed to successfully
complete it. These statistics do not compare favorably with the magnitude of
the problem. The AMA estimates that
10-15% of physicians are seriously impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other mental
impairment. 11 This means there are 7,00010,000 impaired California physicians.
Although such self-reporting has advantages and should certainly be attempted, it is unreliable as a source of information about physician performance and
rehabilitative needs.

F. Detecting Patterns
In addition to telephone calls at point
of intake, all of the information described above should be included in a
case investigation tracking system
(CITS). DMQ has such a system, but it
does not include the information described above. It does not include the
50,000-80,000 initial contacts from consumers, many of which may involve information relevant to physician performance-not that each alone constitutes
evidence of a disciplinable offense, but
insofar as these reports contain information which may, in combination with
other reports and information, reveal a
pattern appropriate for further investigation or other intervention.
As noted above, CITS does not include information about criminal matters
in a timely fashion (at point of arrest),
or about malpractice actions at point of
filing or in all relevant cases. As to the
latter, even those matters which are reported are usually "closed without merit"
where the settlement or judgment is for
damages below $ I 00,000. As does the
statute, DMQ incorrectly assumes that
there is a direct relationship among
the monetary award to a patient, the
severity of the conduct, and the appropriateness of a disciplinary investigation. The concepts are, in fact, distinct. As a result, cases appropriate for
computer entry for detection of marginal
but repeated acts, and which in cumulative impact warrant intervention, are
lost. Separate reports of a physician
who has suffered a DUI arrest, a letter
from a patient complaining about sobriety, a phone call from another patient
about missed appointments, and a malpractice complaint which may allege
facts indicating a lack of sobriety are
currently not in the CITS system. They
should be.
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TABLE 4
AGING OF CASES CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION

0 · 30 days
31 - 90 days
91 - 180 days
181 - 365 days
366+ - days
Totals

G. Proactive Investigations
DMQ conducts proactive investigations primarily involving violations of
section 725 of the Business and Professions Code (excessive prescribing).
Where there are "repeated acts of clearly
excessive prescribing, " 12 they may be
investigated by undercover operations,
pharmacy audits, obtaining patient complaint records, or other means. For
purposes of enforcing the Medical Practice Act, DMQ investigators are considered "peace officers" and may engage
in undercover activities. One impediment
to this enforcement is the fact that section 632(a) of the Penal Code prohibits
one-party consensual taping of communications without the permission of the
district attorney or attorney general.
Sheriff's deputies, city police departments, and the AG's office are exempt
from this requirement. BMQA is now
seeking statutory authority to engage
in one-party consensual taping exempt
from the Penal Code section 632. That
request should be granted.
BMQA investigators, operating as
peace officers, may serve not only subpoenas but search warrants. The statute
concerning medical privacy should be
amended to allow unlimited access to
medical records by DMQ investigators,
subject to confidentiality within DMQ
and appropriate protective orders in
public discipline proceedings, to allow
unlimited search of patient records for
discipline purposes. Such an intrusion
into a patient's privacy occurs for the
benefit of all patients and does not excessively compromise privacy rights
where the information is held confidential within the agency and subject to
protective order confidentiality in later
proceedings and court review.
Proactive investigation by DMQ is
particularly appropriate in cases of suspected drug abuse where dysfunction
can be fatal to patients. Hence, procedures should be established for the affirmative and required drug testing of speci-

MD

AH

TOTAL

122
191
246
202
217
978

47

169
266
310
286
373
1404

75

64
84
156
426

fled medical professionals whose mental
alertness and sobriety are essential to
patient survival. This would include anesthesiologists, surgeons, and others whose
physical fine motor skills cannot be impaired at the risk of irreparable harm.
That system should allow proactive drug/
alcohol testing upon a showing of "reasonable suspicion n that there is a drug/ alcohol
impairment problem as to that person.

H. Backlog
A condition precedent to an effective
discipline system is an office of investigations able to follow up on the reporting and detection of possible abuse as
described above. DMQ now has a backlog of cases which preclude immediate
attention to incoming cases. DMQ staff
has counted a current backlog of 721 cases.
However, this figure is not fully reflective
of the problem because of the limited
definition of "backlog" used by DMQ.
DMQ includes in its backlog only those
cases which warrant investigation but
have not yet been assigned to investigators.
The State Bar properly defines "backlog" as any case which has been in its Office of Investigations longer than six
months (with the exception of cases designated as "complex" by the Bar's Chief
Trial Counsel). Interestingly, DMQ imposes a similar time limit for the investigation of Priority I cases. Although
DMQ's count of 721 unassigned cases
reveals part of the backlog, cases should
also be defined as "backlogged" if they
are in process longer than maximally
acceptable time spans for investigation
or processing. Otherwise, simply assigning a case to someone eliminates a backlog.
Defined in the generally accepted
manner, the BMQA backlog exceeds
1,500 cases. On March 22, 1989, in response to our request, DMQ calculated
the age of cases currently assigned to
investigators (beyond the 721 cases backlogged awaiting assignment). This data
is presented in Table 4, which indicates
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that 419 of the 978 physician cases and
240 of the 426 allied health professional
cases have been under investigation more
than six months without resolution.
Moreover, this backlog may be further
increased if one counts cases delayed or
improperly diverted at the CSR stage
(now described by Chief of Enforcement
Vern Leeper at 1,043 cases), and cases
backlogged in the adjudication process.
This latter backlog includes those cases
delayed post-investigation and would
properly include a substantial percentage
of the 462 cases awaiting accusation
drafting, hearing, or otherwise delayed.
In total, it appears that the backlog
condition of DMQ's discipline system is
more serious than the backlog of the
State Bar's discipline system at its worst
levels.13
The actual backlog of DMQ is much
more serious than the reported 721 figure
suggests because of its qualitative nature.
Five hundred of them are Priority I
cases involving potential patient harm.
In analyzing BMQA's 1989-90 budget,
the Legislative Analyst noted that the
vast majority of cases in DMQ's backlog
are those involving "potential harm" to
patients. Almost 200 of these cases involving Priority I potential harm to
patients have been unassigned for more
than six months.
In order to deal with this emergency,
the staff informed the members of Division of Medical Quality on February
28, 1989 that it was altering the investigation priorities and procedures described in Section II above. The staff noted
that in addition to the current 721 backlogged assigned cases and additional
cases that have been in process well over
six months, and other cases backlogged
in other parts of the system, the number
of cases coming through intake has increased substantially during I 988-89.
The staff memorandum stated: "During
the first half of fiscal year 1988-89 we
received 3,065 complaints. Of the complaints received, 1,507 were put into the
formal investigation process. At this rate
we will experience an increase of 17.2%
in complaints and 18.5% in investigations over fiscal year 1987-88. Using
these figures, we can assume a similar
increase in the investigative backlog and
the CSR complaint processing backlog.
It is clear that absent additional staff
we must make some hard decisions regarding what we investigate formally,
informally and what we just can't investigate. " 14
The four priorities unveiled at DMQ's
March 3, 1989 meeting categorize as
Priority I those cases which demonstrate

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

actual or high potential for patient harm.
The February 28 memo then confesses:
"Due to the severity of these complaints
a target date of 30 days for an assignment to an investigator and 180 days
for completion is reasonable. However,
unless caseloads assigned to individual investigators are decreased, the
completion dates will be difficult to
accomplish."
Priorities 2 and 3 are simply other
cases which do not involve immediate
potential irreparable harm to patients.
"These cases would be handled, at least
initially, by the Consumer Services
Representative, Medical Consultant and
Supervisor." In other words, these
cases will be effectively removed from
the discipline system and subject to a
phone call remonstration or letter of
warning. Fourth priority is given to
complaints that do not involve patient
care issues. These include "insurance
fraud, absent indication that it is willful or repetitive." (It is unclear how
"insurance fraud" is ever not "willful".)
Complaints which are multi-jurisdictional
and where another agency may have
jurisdiction will also be classified as
Priority 4 cases.
It will be nine months or more before
most of the unassigned backlog will be
reviewed. The current DMQ case carryover from year to year now equals in
size (2,000) the total number of new
investigations opened or closed during
a full year. Put another way, BMQA
started this year with a caseload that
was 100% filled. If not a single new
case appeared, more than a year would
transpire before the decks would clear
for the investigators. Additional time
would be required for CSR and AG
backlogs.
The situation with regard to the
DMQ discipline system covering doctors is not a matter of administrative
concern-it is an emergency. In the
face of this emergency, as we discuss
below, BMQA's 1989-90 budget-as
approved by the Department of Consumer Affairs and the Department
of Finance-includes no additional
resources or positions for enforcement. The Legislative Analyst writes:
"BMQA has 44 investigators and 3
limited term assistant investigative positions to investigate complaints.
For 1989-90, the budget proposes to
maintain the same staffing level as
in the current year. " 15 When asked in
December the direct question, "Will
BMQA ever catch up on the unassigned
case backlog?" Mr. Leeper simply answered, "No."
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I. Authority
In order to properly respond to an
overflow situation, address high-priority
items effectively, or properly maximize
limited resources, the DMQ discipline
system needs adequate authority with
which to function. This authority includes investigative authority as described above, and the power to act
effectively in the interests of the public.
Such authority would provide for summary proceedings. It would allow for
the automatic revocation of licenses
upon certain preconditions. It would
provide for interim license suspension
where necessary for public health and
safety. It would also allow the use of
flexible remedies to protect the public
upon a showing lesser than the clear
and convincing requirement for total
license revocation.
We discuss below basic structural
changes for all cases. Critical among
these proposed amendments are provisions to allow interim suspension
of physicians. At present, interim suspension is accomplished through a
temporary restraining order (TRO)
process in superior court which is extremely difficult to accomplish and
rarely attempted. No such orders were
obtained in fiscal year 1987-88, and only
three have been secured since fiscal
year 1985-86 (see Table I). Even in cases
of egregious incompetence, BMQA is
effectively powerless to act to protect
the public. The same kind of interim
relief now used by the Bar to suspend
accused attorneys should be adopted for
DMQ use.

J. Administrative Process
Exhibit I outlines the actual steps of
the administrative process for discipline.
That chart depicts the various levels and
numerous exit points and accommodation opportunities extant. Actual discipline must run this gauntlet. The system
is fragmented at the outset with intake
at seven regional or two district offices
by one of numerous separately operating
CSRs or consumer service technicians.
BMQA receives from 50,000-80,000
phone calls per year from consumers.
Approximately 6,000 are designated
"complaints". That culling is a critical
function. One-half of these 6,000 complain ts are then in turn filtered,
mediated, or closed.
The required qualifications for CS Rs
include two years of experience in state
service including contact with the general public or three years in a profes-
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sional trade or consumer organization
handling consumer complaints. CSRs
are not required to have any expertise
or experience in law or medicine. They
are supervised, again in fragmented
fashion, by separate supervising investigators. The primary motivation of supervising investigators is the management
of the backlog of caseloads described
above. In the manual BMQA supplies
to its CS Rs, the front-line intake personnel who actually receive the information
directly from the complaining public,
BMQA tells the CSRs: "Patients are the
chief source of complaints to the Board."
The next sentence tells the CSRs, however, that "only a small proportion of
patient complaints result in disciplinary
actions against physicians." The manual
nonetheless assures the CSRs that "the
handling of patient complaints is one
of the most important functions of the
CSR (because] the proper handling of
such complaints is critical to the public's
confidence in the Board and the medical
profession." The message is barely hidden: patients who complain rarely have
anything of value, but listen so that they
don't magnify their complaint or extend
it to us.
The primary orientation of medical
consultants has been to "solve problems"
as a mediator. In addition to evaluating
complaints for their merit, the regional
consultants generally view themselves as
"Dutch uncles" to physicians who have
problems. They take pride in meeting
privately with the physician and in
straightening out their problems. They
have no expertise in the law and are
not oriented toward or trained in law
enforcement. Nor are they necessarily
medical experts in the area of medicine
addressed in the complaint.
As Exhibit I makes clear, there are
numerous exit points or opportunities
for "private conferences" with physicians
which result in the closure of matters
prior to formal investigation. Less than
50% of the matters designated as facial
complaints by a CSR are transmitted
for formal investigation. Less than 50%
of the matters formally investigated
result in the filing of formal accusations,
and less than 2% result in recommended
license revocation or suspension. "Scoping" of complaints from intake to final
disposition is to be expected, but not to
this extreme degree. Whatever the failures of outreach or proactive detection,
surely more than I% of the complaints
determined by CSRs to be valid must
warrant actual discipline.
We discussed above the justification
for a centralized intake system. That
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unit should be directed onsite by a
special deputy attorney general appointed for that purpose in consultation with
DMQ. This designated DAG should
supervise a defined group of deputies
who prosecute these cases on behalf of
the people of California. The CSRs
should be trained in the legal requirements for proving a discipline case by
someone trained in that subject.
The special deputy attorney general
assigned to intake should review every
CSR-closed case to guarantee that it is
properly closed under consistent legal
standards, and that it is registered in
the enhanced CITS system for pattern
detection, as described above. The intake deputy attorney general would then
refer cases out, as appropriate, to the
regional medical consultant for "warning conferences" where the violations
are marginal or are not likely to result
in final discipline. The cases that the
deputy attorney general believes are appropriate for further investigation,
based on the consistent application of
the proper legal criteria and an evaluation of the evidence which may be available and capable of achieving a discipline result, will be turned over to the
appropriate regional investigating supervisor for further investigation, as is
presently the case. However, at the same
time, a prosecuting deputy attorney general would be assigned to the case. That
attorney general will supervise the investigative work, assist the investigator
in identifying evidence which must be
obtained in order to sustain any discipline sought, approve closure, and seek
interim suspension where appropriate.
The regional medical consultant
should review the progress of the investigation and comment on its technical
features and medical aspects. The existing MQRCs should serve as expert advisory panels to be used in the evaluation of cases, as expert witnesses at
hearings, and as probation monitors to
those who have been adjudicated appropriate for discipline. The deputy attorney general supervising the case can
direct the gathering of evidence and,
together with the regional medical consultant, refer matters involving expertise
to specific MQRC members or DMQ
volunteers expert in that field of medicine, and review their recommendations.
There is a lack of even facial justification for the use in a discipline process as
adjudicators or final decisionmakers of
persons because they have some medical
expertise where: (a) the judgments they
are rendering are legal judgments, not
medical judgments; and (b) their exper-

tise is not in the area of medicine
relevant to the case. Both serious defects
are remedied where a person with specific legal expertise, responsibility, and
knowledge of statewide standards of
prosecution and appropriate remedies,
can obtain precise medical advice from
the experts who know about that particular field or a particular case. This
revised structure would also facilitate
the undercover operation of investigators since they will be working under
the direct supervision of the deputy
attorney general.
In addition to structural problems,
DMQ's administrative process is suffering a serious work overload. Caseloads
have increased from 35.6 in 1982 to
43.4 in 1987. At present, if the isolated
unassigned backlog were assigned, case
levels would exceed 60 per investigator,
double the prior staff estimates of optimum levels. Perhaps even more important has been an increase in cases
monitoring those on probation. These
cases have increased in number from 65
in 1982, to 75 in 1987. We believe
current levels approximate 80 per investigator. These cases concern those
impaired or incompetent practitioners
extreme enough to survive the vigorous
culling described above. These physicians are a demonstrable danger and
cannot realistically be monitored at
current caseloads.

K. Legal Process:
Hearing and Review
Under the current system, following
the multi-staged administrative review,
the matter goes to hearing before a fivemember panel of the MQRC and/ or an
ALJ from the Office of Administrative
Hearings. The matter is then subject to
review by and oral argument before
DMQ itself.
This administrative process has some
severe drawbacks. First, neither the
MQRC nor the DMQ should participate
in adjudicatory decisionmaking. The
MQRC members should assist in detecting violations, preventive educational
projects, provision of expert testimony,
and probation monitoring, as noted
above. The Division of Medical Quality,
an important body, should not become
involved in oral argument consideration
during its meetings once every three
months as an adjudicative body. It is
there to perform the more important
quasi-legislative function of adopting
rules and setting standards for the profession. Those rules guide the discipline
system in its general parameters. It
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should make judgments about allocation of resources. It should perform the
functions most appropriate for a body
with its expertise and workload.
Second, because the factual determinations, findings, and recommended
discipline are not being decided by a
court, and because a physician has a
constitutional right to "court review",
the end result will usually be judicial
review of the entire proceeding under
the "independent judgment" test. This
phenomenon tends to lessen the value
and utility of what went on before. That
is, the "trier of fact" in an administrative proceeding (either the ALJ or
an MQRC panel with an ALJ making
evidentiary rulings) is the judge who
sees and hears the witnesses, and who
makes the very important factual findings. It is a sensible presumption of
American law that it is important to
see the witnesses and evidence directly.
Evaluating credibility of witness testimony requires physical presence. Courts
accord a great deal of deference to the
factual findings of the person who directly sees the witnesses and their crossexamination, considering not only what
they say, but how they say it. In any
discipline case, these judgments are
of great import. However, the hearing
where this decision is initially made is
not held before a "court". Hence, a
reviewing court, who does not see the
evidence, must exercise its own independent judgment as to what the facts show,
but has only the transcript from which
to work. The more removed one is from
actual testimony, the more one may be
swayed by the vagaries of the adversarial
process and by skilled counsel.
To the extent possible, decisions
should be made by people with the most
information and who have maximum
knowledge and independence. Such is
not the case in the current context.
Rather, panels from one of fourteen
different MQRCs are likely to make the
factual findings. Although the involvement of these persons is justified by the
need to provide "expertise", in fact,
more often than not they lack expertise
in the particular area of medical practice at issue. Likewise, the review by
DMQ, although it consists of a majority
of practicing physicians, is likely not
to involve a review by those with medical expertise in the particular area of
practice involved. Although the decisionmaker should understand the expert
testimony, he/she does not have to be
the medical expert.16
The judicial review process at present
involves writ of mandate consideration
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by any one of almost 1,000 superior
court judges whose decisions are not
reported and who do not normally communicate one with the other. The understandable and inevitable inconsistencies
in their judgments are then resolved by
a series of four different district courts
of appeal. Where there are conflicts at
that level, final resolution may occur by
petition review of the Supreme Court.
However, this means of achieving consistency and judicial review is inefficient
in the extreme.
Instead of a series of decisions which
are, in effect, going to have to be repeated in a six- to eight-year process
where contested by respondents, and at
enormous cost, we propose the following alteration: a Medical Quality Court.
The Medical Quality Court's judges
would perform the same functions as
the ALJs. They would adjudicate cases.
Since this Court would be a part of the
judiciary, its process would satisfy the
constitutional right of judicial review,
eliminating the current duplication,
delay, and expense.
The Medical Quality Court's hearing
judges should be judicial officers equivalent to state superior court judicial
positions. These judges would be experts
in administrative law and in medical
terminology. They would communicate
with each other and know their respective decisions in order to achieve consistency. They would be legally trained,
and specialists in this area of law both
procedurally and substantively. They
would be more knowledgeable than the
ALJs who are currently assigned from a
large pool, and more knowledgeable
than MQRC panel members in areas of
law. Most important, they would be
recognized as judicial officers-as part
of the judicial branch. This means that
their decisions would constitute judicial
decisions sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
An administrative process that now
takes four-and-one-half steps can be
accomplished in two-and-one-half. 17
Following the decision by this panel,
the matter could then be assigned to a
specific court of appeal now existing,
a group of court of appeal judges so
assigned, or a separate court of appeal
panel specifically established for review
purposes (should the volume of cases so
justify). Following the review at the
court of appeal level, there would be
the current discretionary petition for
review to the Supreme Court. It would
be a one- to two-year system instead
of the six- to eight-year system now
in place.
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The system we have described above
is not just a theoretical model; it is the
system which has been accepted by the
State Bar for the discipline of lawyers
and which is now being put into effect.
In adopting this system, the State Bar
Board of Governors surrendered its role
in reviewing the discipline of attorneys.
It still engages in the very important
rulemaking process, as described above,
but has properly deferred to an independent, professional, and expert entity
the determination of these questions in
the public interest. The Bar did so at the
price of a dues increase of $110 per
member for discipline enhancement, including the creation of this court system.

L. Access to
Information-Disclosure
At present, no information is made
public about a physician until or unless
a formal accusation is filed by the Attorney General. Even if a physician is the
subject of nine ongoing investigations
and seven malpractice actions, DMQ
will not release that information, even
where a consumer calls and asks for
the current record of that particular
physician. In fact, the consumer would
be firmly and misleadingly told that the
physician has "no record of discipline".
Nor are the section 801, 802, and 805
reports made public.
With a single toll-free 800 number
and a computerized CITS system that
operates from the intake level, DMQ
could and should provide useful information to consumers who inquire. If
a hospital or colleague asks about a
physician's record, they also deserve to
know the truth. We acknowledge that
most complaints are without merit. This
is true because consumers are often
confused about the jurisdiction of the
agency they are talking to, or about the
legal standards that are currently effective. However, if there are one or more
ongoing investigations designated as
Priority I, it is unclear why that information should be concealed from
consumers who inquire. Certainly, no
information should be disclosed until
the complaint has been reviewed, and it
is determined that the matter is at least
facially appropriate for discipline and
that it falls into a Priority I category
relevant to public safety. It is also
true that any such disclosure should be
made with the appropriate disclaimer,
including the following elements: the
matter is under investigation; no decision has been made to file charges;
there has been no finding of wrongdoing
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by the physician; the matter is still
pending inquiry.
Patients deserve to know the whole
truth about a physician to whom they
entrust their lives, health, and future.
The information has been compiled by
public officials paid through tax dollars
and is subject to appropriate qualification. Where complaints have been filtered from 50,000-80,000 initial calls
made to BMQA, to approximately 6,000
designated as complaints, to 3,000 serious enough to be submitted for investigation and to be prioritized as Priority
1, consumers should be informed upon
request that the physician they inquire
about is the subject of such an investigation. Further, if there is a malpractice
filing or a criminal arrest, both are matters of public record, and the DMQ
(which should be gathering that information as described above) should reveal
that as well to any consumer upon request, again with the appropriate disclaimer.

M. Resources
Under Business and Professions Code
section 2435(e)(3), BMQA is authorized
to assess its members dues sufficient to
accomplish its statutory tasks. The renewal fee it currently requires of most
licensees is set at $290 every two years
(as of 1989). The previous level was
$255 every two years. The amount was
raised from $255 to $290 not in order
to add new enforcement personnel positions, but simply to keep the current
reserve balance surplus at a level equivalent to four months of agency spending. 18
That is, the minimal increase that occurred in 1988 was accomplished for technical budgetary reasons and not to create
any new positions in licensing or discipline.
The minutes of the DMQ meeting
on December 2, 1988 in San Diego illustrate the candor with which the staff
has been attempting to apprise the Division, the Board, and the current state
administration of DMQ's problem. To
quote Enforcement Chief Vern Leeper:
"However, even though these [enforcement] vacancies have been filled, it does
not mean that enforcement program is
out of the red. As far as cases in the
backlog, the program has been in the
red for a couple of years and it doesn't
look like things are going to get any
better." Mr. Leeper described a backlog
in excess of 700 cases statewide, primarily in Orange County, Los Angeles
County, and in the Bay area. Leeper
continued: "The enforcement program
has attempted over the years to acquire

more staff. They have had studies done
by the Little Hoover Commission, the
Department of Finance, and a study
contracted with Arthur Young and Company. Unfortunately, for the last eleven
years, these studies have not helped get
additional staff, with the exception of
two investigative positions to work surveillance cases in 1979. At one time
additional staff was obtained to work
licensing fraud cases when the influx of
licensing fraud cases hit California. The
positions were limited terms and the
enforcement unit has been able to retain
one permanent position."
BMQA requested ten additional positions in fiscal year 1986-87. All ten
were refused. Subsequent smaller requests have been similarly cut from the
budget by the Governor's Department
of Finance. It appears that DMQ has
essentially thrown up its hands following the 1986-87 denials. At its meetings,
its staff and members bemoan these
irresponsible decisions of the Department of Finance, and then resign themselves to the outcome. Requests since
1986-87 have been generally sequentially
smaller up to the present budget. DMQ's
self-surrender creates a Catch-22 which
is as much an abdication as the illadvised denials of the Governor's budget
officials. DMQ is mandated to carry out
a legislative directive and has been straitjacketed into paralysis. Its response
should not be a quiet whimper but a
steadily rising cry of alarm, buttressed
by candid confessions of resource impotence and increasing demands for the
necessary positions.
It is particularly ironic that physicians pay but $145 per year in renewal
fees. This is approximately the same
amount of money that lawyers added to
their dues in 1988 to achieve the current
$417 per year figure they are now paying, primarily for discipline. BMQA
identifies 57% of its budget as allocated
for discipline (in addition to a properly
allocated portion of its overhead). The
Bar, with a licensee base and complaint
level approximately 50% higher, is now
spending over three times more than are
physicians on their discipline system.
We recommend that renewal fees for
physicians should be approximately
doubled as soon as possible. An additional $8-9 million is required to implement the Medical Quality Court system,
to retain the services of the assigned
supervising deputy AG and full-time
staff AGs, and to provide sufficient investigative resources to enable this
agency to accomplish its assigned tasks.
The additional resources-in conjunction

with the efficiency-enhancing changes of
centralizing intake, placing the system
under the control of those with expertise, diminishing the number of adjudicative steps from four to two, and the
other changes discussed herein-would
make a marked difference in the quality
of DMQ's output and of medical care
delivery in California.
What is most puzzling about the failure of the current discipline system is
that it costs the doctors who support it
money. For most medical practitioners,
current malpractice premiums range
from $20,000-$80,000 per year, depending upon specialty. Using a fairly typical
figure of $50,000, the current annual
renewal fees devoted to funding the
physician discipline system amounts to
the malpractice premiums paid every
six hours of a typical 2,000-hour working year.
Studies in the area of attorney malpractice, where premiums are in the
$4,000-$6,000 per year range, indicated convincingly that expenditure
of an additional $110 per year per
attorney would more than pay for _itself in reduced insurance premiums.
For physicians, the argument is far
more telling. First, the premiums are
much higher. Second, the relationship
between malpractice premiums and
discipline is much clearer. Unlike
the case of attorney discipline, which
focuses on dishonesty, BMQA discipline
focuses on drug impairment and gross
incompetence, directly related to claims
payouts which form the purported basis
for insurance premiums. Particularly
in the context of Proposition IOJ's
requirement of effective competition
among insurance companies (the removal of the antitrust exemption), it
is reasonable to assume that at least
a portion of any reduction in claims
payouts will result in a reduction in
insurance premiums.
For far too long, competent physicians who carry malpractice insurance have been cross-subsidizing their
less competent, drug- or alcoholimpaired, and dishonest colleagues.
Such is usually the case in a system
where they themselves control the
means for reducing those harms. In
this case, it is in the interest of
the public and in the self-interest
of those physicians who are paying
so much to eliminate the cause of
that expense.
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V. RECOMMENDED
STATUTORY REFORMS
In addition to the administrative
changes discussed above, a number of
statutory changes are compelled to give
DMQ adequate authority. These statutory changes or additions include the
following:
l. BMQA licensees should be fingerprinted at point of initial written examination and those prints retained for the
limited purpose of entry in the Arrest
Notification System of the Attorney
General. (See Business and Professions
Code section 6054 for analogous section
pertaining to the State Bar.) This change
allows computer entry, review, and tracking at point of criminal arrest rather
than post-conviction years after the
criminal acts.
2. Plaintiffs filing malpractice cases
against physicians should be required by
the clerk of the court to show proof of
service on BMQA. (See SB 1434 (Presley), which would amend Business and
Professions Code section 803.) Section
2220(c) should be amended to delete the
word "unusually", to require the investigation of a "high" number of malpractice awards, and not an "unusually
high" number.
3. Physicians reporting disciplinable
offenses of licensees to DMQ should
have absolute immunity. (Requires amendments to Civil Code sections 43. 7 and
43.8.)
4. BMQA investigators should have
authority, with approval from either the
deputy attorney general assigned to oversee DMQ discipline, or by the DMQ
Chief of Enforcement, to utilize oneparty consensual wiring or taping as
defined in Penal Code section 633 within the scope of enforcing the disciplinary statutes within DMQ jurisdiction.
(Requires amendment of Penal Code
section 633.)
5. DMQ should have authority to
require competency examinations upon
reasonable suspicion of incompetence
liberally defined, including a single act
of negligence. Current law requires a
pattern of acts, death, or serious injury
from a single act before competency can
be tested. (Requires amendment to Business and Professions Code section 2292.)
6. DMQ should have authority to
flunk a physician in an oral competency
exam where two of three examiners fail
to pass the examinee. At present, two
examiners hear the test and both must
vote to fail, followed by a second examination where both must again vote to
fail the physician, or he/ she is deemed
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to have passed. (Requires amendment
to Business and Professions Code section 2293.)
7. All licensees should be required
to inform BMQA whenever:
(a) they are charged with a felony
offense, or with a misdemeanor involving the unlawful possession, sale, or use
of alcohol or dangerous and restricted
drugs; or
(b) they are subject to disciplinary charges by any other California
agency or by physician discipline jurisdictions outside of California (see the
State Bar version at Business and Professions Code section 6068(n)).
8. Business and Professions Code section 805 should require automatic reporting of the circumstances of all denials,
suspensions, restrictions, or revocations
of hospital privileges, broadly defined,
including all resignations. Failure to
report should not be a criminal offense,
but should give rise to civil penalties in
actions brought by the Attorney General
of up to $5,000 per violation, to be
collected by BMQA for inclusion in its
enforcement fund. Intentional evasion
of the statute should be a misdemeanor/
felony "wobbler." (Requires amendment
to Business and Professions Code section 805.)
9. Coroners should be required by
law to report any indication of physician
error, incompetence, or negligence to
DMQ, and should be given absolute
civil immunity for such reporting.
10. Probation reports in criminal
matters concerning licensees should be
sent automatically to BMQA. At present,
they are sealed after thirty days and
DMQ often does not see them.
11. All felony preliminary hearing
transcripts concerning defendant licensees should be sent automatically to
BMQA.

12. The Attorney General should
have the authority to obtain the immediate involuntary suspension from
practice of a licensee who is an imminent threat to patient health by
noticed motion before the proposed
Medical Quality Court. The burden
should shift to the licensee to show
cause why such interim suspension
should not be ordered where:
(a) A pattern of negligent
behavior involving two or more separate
acts threatening the health or safety of
two or more members of the public is
established; or
(b) The licensee is convicted of
a felony or misdemeanor involving alcohol, drugs, or sexual misconduct; or
(c) The Medical Quality Court
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has issued a decision recommending
license revocation.
(See current Business and Professions
Code section 6007(c) provisions as
model; see also current sections 2313,
2236 and 2237 of the Medical Practice
Act.)
13. The authority of the Medical
Quality Court should include broad
powers to grant remedies short of license revocation and suspension in
interim proceedings for the protection
of the public; e.g., provisions requiring
immediate supervision of certain procedures by another licensee, immediate continuing education and retesting, et al.
(See Business and Professions Code section 6007(h) as model.)
14. Although the current "clear and
convincing" test for license suspension
or revocation should remain, DMQ
should have authority to obtain direct
orders by interim or final proceedings
short of such sanctions by a "preponderance of the evidence" test. Hence, if an
interim order or final order is directly
imposed (not as a probationary term
under a revocation or suspension order)
which requires drug testing, continuing
education, reexamination, or supervision
of certain procedures, such an order
could be entered upon meeting the "preponderance of the evidence" test.
15. BMQA should be authorized to
assess disciplined licensees the "reasonable costs of investigation, hearing and
review," and the costs of probation
supervision as well. (See Business and
Professions Code section 6086.10.)
16. BMQA should be subjected to a
statutory goal to eliminate the present
backlog, to preclude future backlogs,
and to conduct all investigations within
six months, except for complex economic
cases which should be investigated within one year. (See Business and Professions Code section 6140.2.)
17. A Complainants' Grievance Panel
should be established to audit classifications of intake as not complaints,
decisions not to proceed to accusation
of designated complaints, and the appropriateness of penalties imposed prior to
accusation and before the process is subject to public scrutiny. (See Business
and Professions Code section 6086.8.)
18. Section 2228 of the Medical Practice Act should be amended to add subsection (e), requiring a licensee on
probation or subject to a direct order
limiting practice to notify patients of
that status and those conditions.
19. Sections 2229 and 2344 should
be amended to clarify that priority is
given to protection of the public and
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not rehabilitation, and that revocation
or protective license restrictions are the
presumed remedy for any licensee who
has been previously disciplined, is on
probation, or who has been or is in a
substance abuse diversion program.
20. Section 2227 should be amended
to make it clear that all disciplinewhether imposed pursuant to public proceeding, agreed to, or imposed in the
secret proceedings prior to filing of an
accusation-be made public, including
warning letters and conferences.
21. Section 2234(c) should be amended
to delete the word "repeated." Even one
negligent act may appropriately result in
some discipline under the lenient terms
of subsections (c), (d), and (e).
22. Section 2313 should be amended
to require more complete reporting of
DMQ performance to the legislature,
including the following: number of consumer calls received; number of consumer calls or letters designated as
discipline-related complaints; number of
calls resulting in complaint forms sent
to complainants and number returned;
number of section 800 reports by type;
coroner reports received; referrals from
other agencies, respectively; number of
complaints and referrals closed, referred
out, or resolved without discipline, respectively, prior to accusation; number
of accusations filed and final disposition
of accusations through DMQ and court
review, respectively; number of cases in
process more than six months from receipt of information concerning the
relevant acts by DMQ to filing of accusation; average and median time in process from original receipt of complaint
by DMQ for all cases at each stage of
discipline and court review, respectively;
number of persons in diversion, and
number successfully completing diversion programs and failing to do so,
respectively; number of licensees interim
suspended or subjected to interim practice limitations pending final discipline,
respectively; probation violation reports
and probation revocation filings and dispositions; number of petitions for reinstatement and their dispositions;
caseloads of investigators for original
cases and for probation cases, respectively.
23. Section 2307 should be amended
to require at least a three-year period
before a physician may petition for reinstatement. At present the waiting period is only one year from the DMQ
decision.
24. Section 2344 should be amended
to require that a quorum of the diversion evaluation committees established
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under section 2342 must include at least
one public member.
25. Section 2354 should be amended
to provide that any failure to comply
with the diversion program shall result
in license revocation unless "the likelihood of successful rehabilitation clearly
outweighs the threat of harm to patients
which might occur as a result of the
impairment."
26. A section should be added to the
Medical Practice Act allowing sworn
testimony in other proceedings to be
used in discipline matters where the
licensee was represented by counsel and
had reasonable opportunity to crossexamine. (See AB 2948 (Floyd) from
1988.)
27. A section should be added to the
Medical Practice Act providing that a
civil negligence judgment is conclusive
proof of negligence for purposes of discipline.
28. A Medical Quality Court should
be created, consisting of three judges
appointed by the Governor, paid at
superior court levels, and subject to all
of the status and protections of judicial
officers in every respect. These judges
would handle all hearings, motions, probation revocations, petitions for reinstatement, and other proceedings of
the DMQ discipline system. The judges
would individually try cases arising only
from DMQ and DAHP, with possible
later expansion to medical discipline
cases of the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the Board of Pharmacy, and the
Board of Dental Examiners.
The Court would serve as a one-step
AP A and judicial proceeding, following
the format of the AP A, but with the
Court substituting for the ALJ and
agency. The statute would cross-reference AP A adjudicatory procedures.
29. Appeals of decisions by the Medical Quality Court should be to a designated court of appeal, such as the Third
District Court of Appeal in Sacramento,
or to a special panel of judges selected
by the Supreme Court for review purposes. This court would review using
the "substantial evidence" test, thus
satisfying due process judicial review
requirements.
30. In order to finance the resources
necessary to diminish the backlog and
to otherwise improve the system, renewal fees should be increased from
$145 per annum to $285 per year. The
additional $140 per licensee should yield
approximately $12 million per annum
and should be spent on payment of full
salaries and overhead contribution for

no fewer than 30 deputy attorneys general to be specifically assigned for
BMQA investigation, supervision, and
prosecution; an increase in the number
of BMQA investigators from 40 to 70;
the creation of a centralized intake
system; enhanced computerization and
information receipt; enhanced investigative resources and support staff; and
the establishment of a Medical Quality
Court with three initial judges and attendant clerks and facilities (two judges in
Los Angeles and one in San Francisco).
Our experience with discipline systems
leads us to estimate the following costs:
I.
2.
3.
4.

AG unit:
$4.8 million
Investigators:
$3.5 million
Centralized intake: $1.2 million
Enhanced
computerization
information receipt: $I.I million
5. Enhanced investigative
resources:
$900,000
6. Medical Quality
Court:
$650,000
7. Additional administrative
overhead:
$1.9 million
Although the numbers total $14 million, most of the changes will save substantial money, including the Medical
Quality Court and other measures, sufficient to reduce current expenses by $2.3
million, while accomplishing effectively
a doubling of current enforcement.
It is recommended that five of the
deputy attorneys general and ten of the
added investigators be assigned to a
special vertical prosecutions unit handling complex and difficult cases, and
that deputy attorneys general be paired
with investigators along specialized
teams (incompetence in major substantive areas, misprescribing, et al.).
It is also recommended that BMQA's
budget process be altered from a biennial renewal process to an annual
process. Annual review by the policy
and fiscal committees is appropriate to
ensure effective expenditure of special
fund monies which are passed on to
consumers as an indirect tax.
31. Budget control language should
be included which prohibits caseloads of
more than 50 probationers or more than
25 diversion program participants per
investigator.
32. Budget control language should
be included which requires BMQA to
spend no less than 5% of its annual
budget on affirmative public outreach
programs informing consumers "how to
complain about a doctor" or otherwise
proactively detecting violation of statutes or standards.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have omitted discussion of numerous bits of evidence in this initial Report:
the analyses of hospital discharges by
California Medical Review Incorporated;
the MQRC Council Report (the Weisman Report), attempting to analyze why
11 of 21 cases of recommended discipline by MQRC hearing were not adopted by DMQ; the Little Hoover Commission's recent report on the quality of
medical care in nursing homes; 19 and
the recent warning sounded by the Legislative Analyst about the lack of resources and the backlog. There are
numerous procedural infirmities we have
not addressed in detail-for example,
the "Physician Peer Counseling Panels"
(PPCPs) now proposed not only for
"misprescribing" physicians, but for
"substandard practice" of medicine as
well. There is also the fact that if DMQ
determines that a local panel hearing a
discipline case is too lenient, the result
is a DMQ review-which takes almost
one year, during which there is no penalty imposition whatever. There is the
fact that even the rare revocations last
only one year, when reinstatements may
be pursued. Most petitions for reinstatement are granted within three years.
But cumulative and repetitious recitation is unnecessary where the breakdown is as in extremis as it is here. The
focus of this Report is on the large
questions where reform would render
moot specific defects. In fact, further
detail only serves to distract from the
basic reforms which are here compelled
and for which support should be forthcoming not only from public officials
but from the profession itself. It is costing the profession money-and lots of
it. And it will cost more and more. The
failure to purge the incompetent, the
drug/ alcohol-impaired, and the dishonest from the profession will result
in further dramatic increases in malpractice premiums already at onerous
levels. Nobody gains from the current
malaise: the victims of malpractice
would rather have their health, the
physicians would rather not pay these
premiums, and the public would rather
not pay for unpredictable care at prices
inflated by the malpractice premium
pass-through.
The current system is mired in an
"old boys club" mentality. It is fragmented, clogged, slow, embarrassingly
solicitous of the profession, and produces virtually nothing. Quite literally,
its final output in revocations makes it
less of an effective remedy for public
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protection than does the current rate of
death from natural causes of those who
should be disciplined.
The answer lies in an effective system of detection, quick action where
there is imminent harm, professional
and thorough investigation, fair hearing,
and the excision or limitation of those
causing professional costs and public
harm. Part of the current cartel system
will have to give up its impeding territory in discipline. DMQ should focus
on the critical area of policy- and rulemaking: the setting of standards, allocation of resources, and review of performance, for which it is appropriately
constituted. Volunteer physicians should
have important roles, especially as expert witnesses and probation monitors.
The system proposed involves a professional, informed, independent structure in which the public can have confidence-professional supervision of
intake, enhanced detection of misbehavior, early intervention where needed,
adequate resources, and a two-step administrative process of quality that combines independence and judicial review
with expertise. We suggest a one- to
two-year system instead of the six- to
eight-year system currently extant. We
suggest production. We suggest consistency. We suggest deterrence. Combined
with a workable diversion program, preventive measures in the competence area,
and effective probation monitoring, we
would expect malpractice premiums to
drop many, many times more than the
relatively trivial $140 per year estimated
as its cost. Indeed, an impact of less
than one-fourth of l % on average malpractice premiums would pay for the
entire increase proposed.
The structure proposed has a precedent: the California State Bar has already reduced its backlog to below the
total levels of DMQ, and is on track to
a model system of discipline by 1990.
We have reason to be at least as demanding of physicians as of attorneys. Those
who argue that the reforms are inappropriate for physicians because attorney
discipline is somehow "different" are in
error. There are differences to be sure,
but they do not relate to the process for
judging incompetence, impairment, or
honesty. Both systems deserve fairness,
authority, and resources to accomplish
similar ends. The basic mechanisms to
achieve these results are the same: comprehensive intake, detection of patterns,
interim suspension powers, adequate and
timely investigations, expeditious hearing and review. How should physicians
differ from this model? Why?
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Two hundred forty-nine (249) section
805 reports were generated in 1987-88,
representing hospitals denying or suspending hospital privileges for physicians
for medical incompetence reasons. Separate from these reports, over 700 physicians suffered malpractice awards or
judgments against them of over $30,000.
During the same period, BMQA revoked
27 licenses. Only 12 physicians were disciplined-revocation, suspension, or even
straight probation-for incompetence.
These are not our numbers. These are
BMQA's numbers. The agency is not
doing its job. It is so moribund it is
unclear why it should continue at all in
its current form. For its malaise, good
physicians pay a heavy price, and consumers pay a heavier one.

FOOTNOTES
I. CPIL's initial report was submitted in draft form to BMQA staff for
comment prior to its release. BMQA's
response was detailed, gracious, and constructive. It was carefully considered in
the formulation of the final report released on April 5, 1989. That review
implies no responsibility for the content
of the report or agreement with its conclusions.
The condensed version printed here
excludes substantial exhibits and footnoted information and substantiation.
The complete version of the report is
available from CPIL's San Diego office.
2. In March 1989, DMQ adopted a
new priority system, which is discussed
infra in Section IV(H).
3. These numbers exclude those physicians subjected to conferences or advice
from Regional Medical Consultants or
others. These discipline outcomes are
"confidential", involve no enforceable
limitations on practice, are not subject
to probation monitoring, and are unknown to consumers and colleagues.
4. See Palarea, Its Time to Eliminate the "Conspiracy of Silence" Pertaining to Impairment, 69(3) Federation
Bulletin 74, 75 (March 1982); Talbott,
Impaired Physicians Program, 73(3)
Federation Bulletin 67, 69 (March 1986).
See also San Jose Mercury News, Oct.
20, 1986, § I, at 11 A; Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 20, 1985, § V, at 19; Los
Angeles Times, May 24, § V, at I.
Dr. James H. Sammons, Executive
Vice President of the AMA, agreed in
his May 4, 1989 letter to the author:
"Responsible clinicians and researchers
in the field believe that the most reliable
data on [physician impairment] incidence
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closely parallel those for the general population-that is, 10% of all adults will
have difficulty with alcohol or drugs at
some point in their lifetimes. There is no
reason to believe that the incidence in
the physician population would be substantially different."
5. See, e.g., Miller v. BMQA, 193
Cal. App. 3d 1371 (1987), which involved
acts showing serious mental incompetence in the late 1970s, a BMQA disciplinary order on December I, 1981, and
a final affirmation on July 3 I, 1987;
Kearl v. BMQA, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1040
(1986), in which an anesthesiologist exhibiting gross incompetence in 1975 was
investigated for five years; an accusation
was filed on October 15, 1980; a DMQ
decision was made on April 30, 1984,
and upheld by the court on November
5, 1986-eleven years after the complained-of acts. These two examples are
typical of current timelines, during which
medical practice continues. Note that
the actual time between receipt of information and final discipline averages just
under four years. However, these outcomes include stipulated discipline.
Where discipline is resisted, the average
time between the acts giving rise to discipline and final discipline exceeds seven
years.
6. See California Regulatory LawReporter Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp.
36-37 for details on AOR's report.
7. The Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act was added by AB I XX in
1975.
8. The number of physicians subject
to hospital privilege denial or withdrawal
in 1987-88 was 249, nine times the number whose licenses were revoked by DMQ
over the same period (see Table 3).
9. See Civil Code sections 47, 43.7,
43.8.
10. The primary incentive for an institution to suspend or revoke the privileges of a practitioner has to do with
its own perception of its liability, and
its competitive and professional injury
should that practitioner continue association with the institution. However, even
where the difficult decision to revoke
privileges is made, there is no mechanism by which a decision of one hospital
to revoke a physician's privileges becomes generalizable for public protection. No matter how exhaustive and
appropriate a decision by a hospital to
revoke the privileges of an obviously
incompetent or impaired practitioner,
every other hospital or institution with
which that physician may hold privileges
may make its own decision. Unless DMQ
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acts to protect the public, the only way
an incompetent or impaired practitioner
is barred from the practice is if every
single private clinic and hospital makes,
seriatim, a similar judgment. Such a private system of limitations is fragmented
and generally ineffective.
11. See supra note 4.
12. See BMQA Investigator's Manual, Chapter 9 at 9-11.
13. For background information on
the State Bar's disciplinary system and
backlog problems, see California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer
1987) p. I.
14. Memorandum from Vern Leeper
to DMQ (February 28, 1989).
15. Legislative Analyst, Budget Report for 1989-90, at 97. BMQA correctly
notes that it requested additional positions for enforcement each fiscal year
from 1986 to the present. It received
over those four years 2.5 additional
permanent positions. It has requested a
total of seventeen positions over this
period, ten of which were requested in
1986-87. All were denied by the Department of Finance before reaching the
legislature.
However, DMQ requests have never
approached the numbers necessary to
create a functioning discipline system,
particularly during the past two years.
Although the Department of Finance
and the current administration rightfully
bear substantial responsibility for DMQ's
lack of resources, BMQA is not a "department" or "bureau" of the executive.
As a creature of the legislature with
quasi-independent regulatory agency
status, it has the responsibility to take
its case to the Department of Consumer
Affairs and the legislature directly and
vigorously where it is impeded from
carrying out its statutory task.
16. In our judicial system, judges
who are not themselves experts listen
and evaluate expert testimony in a variety
of subjects, ranging from complicated
antitrust cases to the licensing of nuclear
power plants without being economists
or nuclear engineers themselves. Ideally,
according to some commentators such
as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, judges
should have available to them their own
staffs of experts to enable them to properly understand those issues. Such expert resources are available to decisionmakers under the system we propose
herein.
17. The current steps-MQRC/ ALJ
hearing, DMQ hearing and review, superior court writ of mandate "independent judgment" review, court of appeal
review, and petition to the Supreme

Court-would become hearing before
Medical Quality Court; appeal to the
court of appeal; and discretionary
petition to the Supreme Court.
18. See California Regulatory Law
Reporter Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988)
p. 62 for background information.
19. See infra agency report on
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION for
further information.

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989)

FEATURE ARTICLE
1987-88 CONSUMER COMPLAINTS
50,000 - 80,000 calls each year
REGION I

REGION 11

REGION III

REGION IV

REGION V

REGION VI
25,000-45,000 calls not
"complaints"
case closed as "mediated
negotiated, settled or
dismissed"
case referred to outside
agency

4,685 "complaints"

♦

(2) Review by Regional Medical Consultant
refer for non-disciplinary
review
refer to outside agency
case closed with merit
(insufficient evidence)
case closed without merit
(3) Review by Supervising Investigator
in respective region

case closed without merit

1

(4) 1,913 investigations opened

(5) Assignmen~to investigator
in respective region

case closed without merit

•

(6) Review by Regional Medical Consultant
case closed

1

refer case to expert panel
refer to MQRC for review

(7) Review by Chief Medical Consultant

informal review with
subject (257)

l

confidential

referral to MQRC
referral to Diversion (28)

(8) 181 cases referred to AG

T

-------------------------

1

1
l

(9) 109 accusations filed

accusation not filed
(case closed or referred
back for further
investigation)
-------------------------------------------•

accusation withdrawn (18)
accusation dismissed {12)

(10) Hearing by MQRC or DMQ panel

♦

accusation dismissed

(11) 92 decisions rendered

public

licensees
probation

27 lice

revoked

(2

other)

Court Review

••

( 12) Superior Court

(13)

Court of Appeal

(14) Supreme Court

case reversed, dismissed,
mediated
case reversed, dismissed,
mediated
case reversed, dismissed
mediated

TOTAL TIME ELAPSED: 6-8 YEARS
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